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Comment

Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call
to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning
the Battery Approach
INTRODUCTION

In its most basic form, the concept of medical "informed
consent" represents the right of a competent person to participate
in decisions about their medical care.' Patients today generally
assume that health care providers will explain the nature of their
illness, share information regarding treatment options, and discuss
their respective risks and expected benefits. 2 In theory, this simple
doctrine is an integral and well-established component of the
doctor-patient relationship. 3 In reality, there is a significant gap
between the ideal of the ethical and legal doctrines of informed
consent, and actual clinical practice. 4 This is due, in part, to the
development of a body of informed consent law that, for all of its
complexity, only demands of providers a minimum level of
1. See FAY A. RozovsKy, CONSENT TO TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE xxxi (2nd ed., 1990).
Medical informed consent embodies the fundamental principle that consent of a patient must
be obtained before any medical treatment is undertaken. See J. STEWART SHOWALTER, THE LAW
OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION 335 (3rd ed. 1999). The doctrine of informed consent is
applicable in both medical and research settings. See TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 142 (4th ed. 1994). This comment will discuss the doctrine as
it applies to medical treatment.
2. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L REv. 261, 264 (1999).
3. See Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L REV. 171, 221
(1994).
4. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent - Must It Remain a Fairy Tate?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L & PoL'Y 69 (1993). "Informed consent in today's world is largely a charade which
misleads patients into thinking that they are making decisions when indeed they are not." Id.
at 84.
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disclosure and communication with patients.' This is particularly
true in Pennsylvania.
Informed consent as a legal doctrine had its genesis fairly
recently but evolved rapidly, reflecting changes in societal attitudes
about health care and advances in medical technology and ethics.6
Unfortunately, this evolution seems to have ended in Pennsylvania
in 1966. That year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Gray
7 which established an approach to medical informed
v. Grunnagle,
consent that fails to fulfill the goals of the doctrine.8 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to abandon this approach,
remaining one of two jurisdictions in the United States still basing
informed consent disclosure requirements regarding complex
medical issues on simplistic contract and battery theories.9 All
other jurisdictions recognize that informed consent is better
examined under theories of negligence.1°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed its adherence
to the battery approach to informed consent and the restriction of
physician disclosure requirements to highly invasive procedures
such as surgery." The court held that injecting a needle into the
ribcage did not require disclosure of the risks of the procedure. 2
Although the physician's action resulted in a possibly fatal
collapsed lung, the patient was precluded from bringing an action
based on the failure of informed consent.1 3 Pennsylvania's battery
approach to informed consent has resulted in a restriction of
informed consent requirements to surgery and similar procedures.
Physicians are not required to obtain informed consent for
non-surgical treatments. 14 Viewing failure of informed consent as
causing an action in battery also means that a patient who
5. See id. at 77.
6. EDWARD P. RICHARDS III & KATHERINE C. RATHBUN, MEDICAL CARE LAW 209 (1999).
7. 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966). See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Gray.
8. See Part I of this comment for a discussion of the goals of the informed consent
doctrine.
9. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the battery theory
of informed consent.
10. See Jon F Merz, On a Decision Making Paradigm of Medical Informed Consent,
14 J.LEG.-MED. 231 (1993).

11. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997). See infra notes 178-88 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Morgan.
12. See Morgan, 704 A2d at 617.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 617. See Part III-C of this comment for a discussion of the distinction
between surgery and non-surgery in Pennsylvania informed consent law.

2000

Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law

contends that a physician failed to disclose material information
about the surgical procedure need not demonstrate a causal
15
relationship between the failure and any damages suffered.
The Pennsylvania legislature recently amended the Health Care
Services Malpractice Act ("HCSMA"), 16 including a new definition of
informed consent.1 7 This new definition attempts to extend the
disclosure requirements to a short list of procedures that go
beyond, but are closely related to, surgery.18 The amendment also
seems to require a negligence approach to informed consent, by
adding a causation requirement wholly inconsistent with the
traditional battery approach.19 The statute has received little
20
attention by commentators and Pennsylvania courts.
Part One of this comment briefly discusses the development of
the ethical doctrine of informed consent and its function in medical
practice. Part Two follows the history of the legal doctrine of
informed consent in the United States. Part Three examines the
evolution of Pennsylvania informed consent law. Part Four analyzes
the current state of the law in Pennsylvania, considering the goals
of the ethical and legal doctrines. This comment will suggest that
current Pennsylvania informed consent legislation and the
analytical approach used by the courts of the Commonwealth do
not adequately fulfill these goals. Pennsylvania medical informed
consent law may prove particularly inadequate, considering the
continued changes in the doctor-patient relationship and in the
delivery of services brought on by the proliferation of a managed
care approach to health care.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE IN MEDICAL

PRACTICE
A brief discussion of the ethical doctrine of informed consent,
and its incorporation into medical practice, is necessary to fully
examine the state of the legal doctrine. Medical procedures, even
many that are considered routine by today's standards, are highly
intrusive invasions of bodily integrity.21 The circumstances and
15. See Sauro v. Shea, 390 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). See Part IU-D of this
comment for a discussion of informed consent causation in Pennsylvania.
16. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301.101 - .1004 (1998).
17. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301.811-A (1998).
18.

40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301.811-A (a)(1)-(5) (1998).

19.
20.
21.

40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301.811-A(d).
See infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HCSMA.
See RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 209. Medical care has been described as the "most
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decisions surrounding these procedures are deeply personal and
can have serious consequences, including death. In recognition of
the seriousness of the problem, "a general, inchoate societal
demand has developed for the protection of patients' . . . rights,
particularly their autonomy rights." 2 However, beyond general
recognition that the ethical principle of autonomy 2 3 requires
freedom to make one's own decisions about medical care, there is
little consensus regarding the content of the principle.2 4 Evolving
from this principle is the doctrine of informed consent, which
focuses on protection of autonomous choice and control over
decisions regarding one's body and medical care.25 This autonomy
is achieved by the patient's active involvement in decisions about
medical care. At the very least, this includes disclosure by the
physician of the nature, benefits, risks, and alternatives to any
proposed treatment. Ideally, it involves a true sharing of the
decision-making process at all phases of treatment.
A.

Consent and Organized Medicine

Surprisingly, organized medicine has not always held in high
regard the concept of patient autonomy. Early medical history
shows no articulation of the role of the patient in the medical
decision making process.2 6 In fact, early tenets of medical care
encouraged a paternalistic2 7 approach to the patient, and even
espoused avoiding discussions with the patient about the patient's
care.28 Hippocrates encouraged the physician "to conceal most
things from the patient while attending to him . . . revealing
nothing of the patient's future or present condition."29 The
intrusive private act done to a free person." Id.
22. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 142.
23. See Krause, supra note 2, at 268. "The doctrine of informed consent is rooted in
the concept of 'self-determination.' "Id. Autonomy can be defined as "self governance, liberty
rights, [and] individual choice." See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 120.
24. See Krause, supra note 2, at 268 n.12.
25. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy & Informed Consent, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379,
385 (1990).
26. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 176.
27. "Paternalism... is the intentional overriding of one person's known preferences or
actions by another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the goal of
benefiting or avoiding harm to the person whose will is overridden." BEAUCHAMP, supra note
1, at 274. Medical paternalism, then, would entail a physician overriding the patient's own
wishes by making a decision the physician believes to be in the patient's best interests. See
Krause, supra note 2, at 269.
28. See Katz, supra note 4, at 72.
29. HIPPOCRATES, OATH OF HIPPOCRATES, in 1 Hippocrates 299-301 (W.H.S. Jones trans.,
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American Medical Association ("AMA") demonstrated a similar
attitude in its 1847 Code of Ethics, stating that patient "obedience
: * .to the prescriptions of their physician should be prompt and
implicit. They should never permit their own crude opinions... to
influence their attention to their physicians." 3 This approach to
3
medical care persisted into the first half of the twentieth century. '
The attitude of physicians began to change during the early
1900's.32 In the first few decades of the century, the practice of

medicine was drastically altered.33 Before this period, physicians
had worked primarily in the patient's home, surrounded by family
and friends.3 In the first part of the twentieth century, the care
setting began to shift to the hospital, where the patient inherently
lost some sense of autonomy and required the protection afforded
by the principles of consent to treatment.35 Consent to treatment
was also less of an issue prior to this era because medical
"science" was in its infancy and there was little in the way of
36
choice regarding effective treatment options for a given condition.
As medical science and technology advanced, however, physicians
had available to them a variety of treatment strategies, each with
3
benefits and risks that a competent adult may want to consider.
These changes in the practice of medicine set the stage for an
increased respect for patient autonomy resulting in an emphasis on
bare consent to treatment s
B.

From Consent to Informed Consent
It was not until after the Nuremberg trials following World War II

1962).
30. American Medical Association: Code of Ethics (1847) reprinted in JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATiENT 2 (1984). See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the most recent version of the AM~s Code of Ethics.
31. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE U. 899, 934 (1994).
32. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 182-83.
33. See id. at 175.
34. See id. When care was provided in the home, "the situs of care put the physician
into the patient's world." Id.
35. See Jones, supra note 25, for a discussion of the diminished sense
of autonomy
exhibited by hospital patients. Szczygiel refers to the period between 1905 and 1930 as the
"era of consent." Szczygiel, supra not& 3, at 175. The issue in most early cases was whether
surgeons could alter the surgical plan while the patient was anesthetized. Id. at 184. The
doctrine of bare consent to treatment developed from the ancient notion that one's body
should not be touched without one's approval. Id.
36. See RIcHARDS, supra note 6, at 209.
37. See id.
38. See id. See infra Part 11-A for a discussion of the lack of bare consent and the
resultant cause of action for battery.
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that the concept of informed consent became a legal and ethical
issue of note. 39 Within a decade of the Nuremburg trials, a United
States court considered whether a patient had been provided with
sufficient information to make an informed decision about whether
to undergo a medical treatment.40 By 1972, 41 courts were giving the
idea of informed consent a detailed examination, and by the 1980's
the doctrine was finally receiving thorough analysis in medical
ethics.4 2 This was accompanied by a change in the status and role
of the physician, and in the physician-patient relationship. This
phenomenon has been described as the "demystification of
medicine,"43 and included the transformation of patients from
passive objects, subject to the "cloak" of medical decision making,
to consumers of health care.4 The change resulted in a societal
demand for a less paternalistic approach by physicians. Patients
began to claim a right to make decisions about their medical care
4
based on accurate information provided by the physician. 1
As might be expected, given the profession's early view of the
patient's role in medical decision making, organized medicine's
response to the evolving emphasis on patient autonomy and
disclosure requirements was less than enthusiastic. 46 Informed
consent based on the idea of patient autonomy has been described
as an "unnatural graft into medical practice" and "alien to medical
thinking."4 The belief among many physicians that a paternalistic
and authoritarian approach is in the patient's best interests
remained prevalent well into the late 1900's.

48

This position was

based on three assertions: (1) that the depth and breadth of the
49
physician's knowledge cannot be comprehended by the patient;
39. See BeAucHAMP, supra note 1, at 142.
40. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. App. 1957).
See infra note 52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Salgo. •
41. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 E2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Canterbury.
42. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 176. The patient's role in the decision making
process was recognized in the American Medical Association's 1980 revisions to its code of
ethics. Id. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the changes.
43. See RiCHARDS, supra note 7, at 209.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 934.
47. See KATZ, supra note 30 , at 1.
48. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 217.
49. See Katz, supra note 4, at 74. It is true that the patient cannot comprehend the
physician's knowledge. Id. But, "it does not necessarily follow that [the] physician cannot
translate [his] ... knowledge into language that comports with patients' experience and life
goals (i.e. into language that speaks to quality of future life, expressed in words of risks,
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(2) that the passive, childlike behavior of people who are ill makes
them incapable of making rational decisions on their own behalf;5°
and (3) that the patient can rely on the physician's commitment to
altruism to protect the patient's interests.5 1 Accordingly, the
impetus for the development of a true "informed" consent doctrine
did not come from the efforts of organized medicine, but rather the
law.
The 1957 case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board
of Trustees52 went beyond requiring bare consent to treatment and
held that a physician has a duty to disclose all facts necessary for
the patient to make intelligent decisions.5 This holding shocked the
medical community.m Then, in 1972, the seminal informed consent
case of Canterbury v. Spence5 altered the standard by which the
adequacy of the physician's disclosure of information would be
judged.5 Rather than relying on what a reasonable medical
professional felt was appropriate, the court held that disclosure
which a reasonable patient would desire was the appropriate
57
standard to apply.

The advent of this lay person's standard resulted in intense
lobbying efforts by physicians to enact legislation restricting the
disclosure requirements, and mandating the use of the professional
standard.5 A quote from a 1976 article from the Journal of the
American Medical Association illustrates the prevailing attitude of
the medical profession at the time, "Informed consent is a legalistic
benefits, alternatives and uncertainties)." Id. Unfortunately, "physicians have had too little
training... or commitment to, communicating their 'esoteric knowledge' to patients." Id.
50. See id. "We do not know whether the childlike behaviors often displayed by
patients, is triggered by pain, fear, and illness . . . or by doctors' unwillingness to share
information with patients." Id.
51. See id. at 74. Katz notes, "Altruism can only promise that doctors will try to place
their patients' medical needs over their own personal needs. Altruism cannot promise that
physicians' will know, without inquiry, patients' needs." Id. The agenda and value system of
the doctor may not be those of the patient. Id..
52. 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. App. 1957).
53. Salgo, 317 R2d at 181. "[A] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment." Id. at 181.
54. See Katz, supra note 4, at 76.
55. 464 F2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 786. The court in Canterbury held that the physician must disclose the
information that the reasonable patient deems appropriate. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 191. After Canterbury, courts in several jurisdictions
raised the informed consent requirements beyond what physicians were accustomed to
disclosing. Id. In the period from 1975 to 1977, nearly one half of the states codified
informed consent requirements based on the less-threatening professional standard. Id.
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fiction that destroys good patient care and paralyzes the
conscientious physician... the integrity of the physician continues
to represent the most effective guarantee of the rights of the
patient. "9
Commentators on informed consent can be divided into two
groups: realists and idealists. 6° The realists are represented by many
practicing physicians who oppose the disclosure requirements of
informed consent. 61 The realists argue that any gains in patient
autonomy produced by sharing the decision making process with
the patient are not worth the additional time, money, and needless
patient anxiety that results. 62 Idealists, composed primarily of
judges and medical ethicists, argue for expansive informed consent
disclosure requirements for physicians. 63 The idealists contend that
the doctrine is necessary to protect patient autonomy. 4 The
idealists hold that doctor-patient interactions should be dialogic,
tailored to the patient's cognitive abilities, considerate of the
patient's emotional status, and encourage a sharing of the medical
decision-making process.65
59. Eugene G. Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 JAMA 1579, 1584-85
(1976). Some commentators argue that informed consent is still a fiction and that physicians
have refused to embrace the doctrine beyond minimal disclosures required by law. See
Schuck, supra note 31, at 934. "One revealing sign of the extent to which physicians
orchestrate a more or less perfunctory process is the now common locution among
physicians. They do not say they have obtained the patient's consent; rather, they say they
have 'consented the patient.' " Id.
60. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 903.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Schuck, supra note 49, at 904. The idealists call for an expansion of disclosure
requirements, citing the fact that there is a significant difference between the disclosures
required by law and those that occur in actual clinical practice; commonly referred to as the
"informed consent gap." Id.
65. See id. The proponents of informed consent argue that the doctrine "protects the
patient's right to determine his own destiny in medical matters; it promotes his status as an
autonomous human being; it guards against overreaching on the part of the physician; [and]
it protects his physical and psychic integrity and thus his privacy." Alan Meisel, The
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing
Values in Medical Decision Making, 1979 Wis. L REV. 413, 414-15 (1979). Opponents of the
doctrine argue that it
wastes valuable time that could be spent in rendering treatment to the ill, in part
because patients do not understand what they are told and in part because they do
not want to be informed; it undermines the trust which patients need to reposit in
their doctors if they are to be successfully treated; and it requires disclosure of
information about the possibility of risks of treatment or failure of the treatment that
may lead to a psychologically induced self-fulfilling prophecy.
Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
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By the 1980's, the evolution of the doctor-patient relationship and
the importance of informed consent were reflected in the ethical
codes of organized medicine. 6 The 1980 version of the AM.A~s
Principles of Medical Ethics ("Principles"), in effect today, includes
the statement "[a] physician shall respect the rights of patients."67
The AMAs Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs provides
interpretation of the basic premises set forth in the Principles and
recognizes that informed consent is a basic social policy.68 "The
patient has the right to receive information from physicians and to
discuss the benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate treatment
alternatives,"69 and "the patient should make his or her own
70
determination on treatment."
C. The Reality of Informed Consent Today
In the twenty years since the development of this new AMA
approach to informed consent, the boundaries of the doctor-patient
relationship have been redefined, and the attitudes of a new
generation of physicians have been altered. 71 Clinical practice,
however, is far from the ideal set forth in the AMAs code. There is
evidence that patients generally are not satisfied with the amount
of information provided to them, and that discussions that take
place with physicians are perfunctory, rather than meaningful.7 2
These interactions actually tend to enforce, rather than diminish,
66.
67.

See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 214.
AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, reprinted in JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN

MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL

ASSOCIATION, 1981 [hereinafter CURRENT OPINIONS, 1981].
68. CURRENT OPINIONS, 1981.
69. CURRENT OPINIONS,
1981, Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 1. Interestingly, this document begins with the following statement, "From
ancient times, physicians have recognized that the health and well-being of patients depends
upon a collaborative effort between physician and patient." Id. This statement seems
inconsistent with the historical position of organized medicine toward the role of the patient.
See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
70. Id. Note that the AMAs position references "treatment" and "healthcare." Id.
Nothing in this document indicates that the AMA would support Pennsylvania's position that
informed consent is required by law only as it pertains to surgery and similar situations. See
infra Part II of this comment for a discussion of Pennsylvania's restriction of informed
consent to specific procedures.
71.

BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L GEANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY JOST & ROBERT L.

ScwARTz, HEALTH LAw, § 6.9 (1998).
72. See Schuck, supra note 49, at 932. "[Tjhe usefulness of informed consent depends
on a meaningful [dialogue] between physician and patient." Id. at 933. Schuck notes,
however, that "[pihysicians discourage active give-and-take dialogue." Id.
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the authority of the physician in the relationship 7 3 Disclosures by
the physician are often tailored to influence the patient toward
agreeing with the physician's choice of treatment.7 4
The knowledge gap between physician and patient, and the noted
limitation of communication that occurs between the two, supports
the need for thorough informed consent procedures. More so than
in any other market, healthcare consumers are incapable of acting
as sophisticated or informed consumers. 75 This is particularly true
as the traditional role of the physician changes due to shifts in
healthcare financing and the healthcare delivery model.7 6 The new
emphasis on cost containment is altering the traditional
physician-patient relationship. 7 Potential incentives to economize
on the information provided to patients conflict with the theory
78
and purpose of the informed consent doctrine.
Although the ethical doctrine of informed consent has influenced
medical practice, there is still a significant gap between the theory
of disclosure embodied in the ideal of informed consent and actual
clinical practice. 79 The challenge has been, and continues to be,
finding a way to transform the societal demand for respect for
patient autonomy into a meaningful and manageable medical policy.
The issue that will be addressed in the remainder of this comment
is the role of the law in defining the requirements of informed
consent, and thereby defining the physician-patient relationship.
73. See id.
74. See Meisel, supra note 65, at 413. That patients make their own choice of treatment
is questionable "because disclosures can (and indeed usually will) be made by the physician
in such a way as to assure that the patient agrees to the treatment." Id. at 416.
75. See RiCHARDS, supra note 6, at 209.
76. See Krause, supra note 2, at 273-75, 284 for a general discussion of these changes.
77. See id. at 284.
78. See Krause, supra note 2, at 273. The relationship between the physician and
patient is traditionally unique and difficult to classify, reflecting a duty of care under a
negligence analysis, elements of a contractual relationship, and elements of a fiduciary
relationship. Id. The elements of fiduciary duty to the patient are particularly important given
the potential conflicts of interest on the physician's part. Id. The interests of the physician
are changing as she is increasingly under pressure by third party payors to contain the costs
of health care. Id. This may create incentives to decrease the amount of information shared
with the patient. Id. This problem is acutely evident when physicians are under managed
care "gag clauses." Id. at 293. Gag clauses are provisions in a physician's provider contract
with the managed care organization that limit the type of information, including treatment
alternatives, that the physician is permitted to discuss with the managed care patient. Id.
Such cost containment measures have altered the fiduciary duty of the physician toward
the patient. Krause comments that physicians now have a triple loyalty, toward (1) their
patient, (2) their own financial well-being, and (3) toward society to conserve limited health
care resources. Id. at 284.
79. See Jones, supra note 27, at 398.
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II.

HISTORY OF THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

The legal doctrine of informed consent has been an important
catalyst in forcing change in the practice of medicine. 0 The formal
doctrine only appeared in American law three decades ago, but has
evolved rapidly.8 " Informed consent has ancient roots, however, in
the concept of individual bodily integrity free from interference
without consent or legal authority.82 Early caselaw regarding
unconsented-to surgeries easily fit this notion into the analytical
framework of traditional batteryY. Whether the patient had been
given enough information to intelligently consent was then
examined by considering the contractual nature of the
physician-patient relationship.84 These approaches, however, gave
way in the middle of the twentieth century to the negligence
analysis now utilized by every United States jurisdiction other than
5
Tenifessee and Pennsylvania.
A.

The Battery Approach to Informed Consent

Most discussions of medical informed consent begin with the
famous 1914 opinion by Associate Justice Benjamin Cardozo in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals.6 This opinion
challenged the discretion of a physician to extend the scope of a
surgical procedure beyond that agreed to by the patient.8 7 Cardozo
wrote,
80. See Katz, supra note 4, at 71.
81. See FURROW ET. AL., supra note 71, at § 6.9.
82. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Union Pacific
represents early support by the United States Supreme Court for the notion of bodily
integrity. Id."[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person." Id.
83. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). Mohr involved surgery on a part of
the body other than the one discussed with the patient before surgery. Id. at 15-16.
84. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943). "[1If
a physician advises his patient to
submit to a particular operation and the patient weighs the dangers and results incident to
its performance and finally consents, he thereby in effect enters into a contract authorizing
his physician to operate to the extent of the consent given but no further." Id. at 481.
85. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 189. "The disparity in status and information
between physicii-s and patients made a contract analysis unsatisfactory. Id. Both
Pennsylvania and Tennesse still examine the physician-patient relationship as, primarily,
contractual in nature and hold that all actions for failure of informed consent create an
action in battery. See Merz, supra note 10, at 232 n.3.
86. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
87. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. The patient in Schloendorff had agreed to a surgical
examination, but while under anesthesia, the surgeon removed a fibroid tumor discovered
during the examination. Id.The patient suffered postoperative complications including the
amputation of several fingers. Id.
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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without the patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
This is true, except in cases of medical emergency, where the
patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate
88
before consent can be obtained.
The Schloendorff opinion characterized the wrong as a trespass,
and not a negligent act.8 9 This characterization relied on earlier
cases involving surgery that went beyond the procedures agreed to
or that the patient had expressly rejected 0
The touching of another without express consent constitutes
battery 1 Medical battery occurs when a patient is subjected to an
examination or treatment without express or implied consent.9 2 The
battery approach to informed consent seeks to protect the patient's
physical integrity and personal dignity from harmful and unwanted
contact.93 To successfully bring an action for battery due to a lack
of consent, a plaintiff must show that she was subjected to an
examination or treatment that included bodily contact, and that the
touching was intentional in nature.9 4 The patient will not be
required to demonstrate that the touching was the proximate cause
of any damages, as the touching itself is the offense. 95 Hence, there
88. Id. at 93. Most jurisdictions now recognize several exceptions to the requirement of
obtaining. informed consent, including: (1) emergency situations when the patient is
incapable of consenting; (2) a "therapeutic privilege" when disclosure presents a threat of
harm to the patient; and (3) an exception for risks that-ought to be known by reasonable
persons or already known to the particular patient. See Krause, supra note 2, at 271 n.29.
89. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 193.
90. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 12. In Mohr, a physician had been authorized to operate on
one ear, but once in surgery determined it was the other that needed surgery. Id. The
surgery was successfully completed, but this constituted a technical battery. Id. See also
Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 522 (IlM.1906). In Pratt,a woman's ovaries were surgically removed in
an attempt to treat epilepsy and depression. Id. at 562. The woman had not consented to the
surgery, so the action was based on battery. Id. Note that neither of these cases involves a
failure of the information provided to the patient on which the patient made a decision. Both
are cases of surgery with a complete failure of consent.
91. See W.L PROSSER, LAW OF Tows § 10 (4th ed., 1971).
92. See id. at § 9.
93. See Lynne Heckert, Informed Consent in Pennsylvania- The Need for a Negligence
Standard, 28 Viu L REV. 149, 153 (1982).
94. See Rozovsy, supra note 1, at § 1.2.
95. See id. A California case illustrates the battery approach in the context of an
unauthorized medical examination. See Inderbitzen v. Lane Hosp., 12 P.2d 744 (Cal. App.
1932). In Inderbitzen, a woman in labor was given a pelvic examination by several medical
students in spite of her protestations. Id. at 746. Once the patient objected, the examination
became a trespass on her body. Id.
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is no causation requirement in an action for failure of informed
consent based on a battery theory, and the action may be
successful even though the procedure in question was skillfully
performed with beneficial results.9 6
Originally, the sufficiency of information provided and the nature
of the physician-patient relationship were examined under
principles of contract law." The Schloendorff opinion also reflected
the importance placed on individual autonomy by the Supreme
Court in the first few years of the twentieth century.9 The consent
required by Schloendorff had its basis in the prominent and ancient
legal principle of consent in contract law."9 Consent in the law of
contracts represents respect for personal dignity and deference to
individual choice and autonomy. 1°0 In the first two decades of the
twentieth century, cases such as Schloendorff established that bare
consent was necessary to avoid an action based on battery.0 1
As the century progressed and the practice of medicine became
more sophisticated, courts began to consider whether the patient
10 2
had been given sufficient information to give true consent.
Analysis in the framework of a contractual relationship eventually
proved unsatisfactory for two reasons.10 3 First, the vast disparity of
knowledge between the physician and the patient creates too great
an inequity in bargaining power."°4 Second, the potential conflicts of
interest faced by the physician should create a fiduciary duty that
goes beyond that of a mere party to a contract.10 5 The California
Supreme Court adopted the latter position in Moore v. University
of California Regents.1 6 This fiduciary duty calls for a more
96. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 12.
97. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943).
98. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner addressed liberty of
contract. See id.
99. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 900-01. "Consent is the master concept that defines
the law of contracts in the United States." Id. at 900.
100. See id.
101. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 188.
102. See id. at 189. Advances in medical technology created new medical tools and
procedures that involved the risk of serious harm. Id. Courts began to examine whether
patients were being given sufficient information about the risks and alternatives to make

intelligent decisions. Id.
103. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 921.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. 793 P.2d 479 (cal. 1990). In Moore, the patient's physician was involved in
potentially profitable research that would benefit from blood and tissue samples from the
patient. Id. at 480. The physician did not disclose this information to Moore before he chose
to have multiple tissue samples taken, believing the procedures to only be part of his

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:917

complete disclosure than the law of contracts would demand of a
10 7
product seller.
B.

Development of the Negligence Approach to Informed Consent

Detailed examination of the legal doctrine of informed consent
and the erosion of an analysis based on contract and battery law
began with the 1957 case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
University Board Of Trustees.08 Salgo established the modem view
of informed consent, stating that the physician violates his duty to
his patient if he fails to provide information necessary for the
patient to form intelligent consent to the proposed treatment. 10 9 The
battery approach was explicitly rejected three years after Salgo,
when the Kansas Supreme Court decided Natanson v. Kline.110 The
Natanson court held that the failure to disclose to the patient
sufficient information to allow informed consent to the procedure
was an action based in negligence and not based on an
unconsented to touching, as in battery."'
The elements of an action for failure of informed consent under
a negligence theory include; (1) a relationship between physician
and patient;" 2 (2) a duty to disclose relevant information;" 3 (3) a
failure to disclose material information to the patient;" 4 (4)
establishing that the patient would not have consented to the
treatment protocol. Id. The court in Moore characterized this as a failure of the physician's
fiduciary duty and noted the potential conflicts of interests on the physician's part. Id. at 483.
107. See Schuck, supra note 49, at 921. "[H]ealth care providers are under a
(fiduciary) duty to their patients, a duty that product sellers or most other risk creators do
not owe. Id. (footnotes omitted).
108. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. App. 1957). In Salgo, a patient was paralyzed because of a
procedure performed on his back, and sued for failure to disclose the risk of paralysis. Id. at
181. The court stated that, "[A] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment." Id.
109. Id. at 181.
110. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). Natanson involved the administration of cobolt
radiation after a mastectomy. Id. at 1095. The patient successfully contended that she had
not been apprised of the potential hazards of the treatment. Id. at 1099.
111. Id. at 1100-03. In Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court outlined why the use of a battery approach is not appropriate: "[Blattery is
commonly perceived as a act of an antisocial nature; the act complained of in non-disclosure
is not within the traditional idea of 'touching'; the failure to inform is generally not an
intentional act and is thus inconsistent with the requirement that battery be intentional; the
doctor's malpractice insurance may not cover assault and battery; and informed consent
actions do not appear to be appropriate cases for punitive damages." Id. at 313.
112. See RozovsKy, supra note 1, § 1.15.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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chosen course of treatment;1 5 and (5) establishing that the failure
to disclose was the proximate cause of damages." 6 The latter two
elements constitute the causation requirement that is absent under
a battery approach.
In 1972, the California Supreme Court rendered its opinion in
Cobbs v. Grant."7 The Cobbs opinion set forth the rationale behind
abandoning the battery approach to informed consent in favor of a
1 18
negligence approach.
The Cobbs court stated that it was
inappropriate to use the intentional tort of battery when the actual
wrong- was an omission, and the physician acted without intent to
injure the patient.' 9
Exactly what information must be disclosed has been the subject
of substantial litigation, but the underlying principle is that the
patient must be provided adequate information to make an
informed decision about the proposed course of treatment. 20 This
generally includes the diagnosis, material risks and probable
benefits of the proposed treatment, and reasonable treatment

alternatives. 121
Much of the evolution of informed consent law has addressed
the standard by which the adequacy of disclosure is judged. While
Natanson based the physician's duty to disclose on the patient's
right of autonomy and self-determination, the court examined the
adequacy of the physician's disclosure by looking to accepted
medical practices. 22 The court held that the alleged failure to
disclose would be judged by the standards of the reasonable
medical practitioner. 2 3 This came to be known as the "professional
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. 502 P.2d 1 (Ca. 1972).
118. Id.
119. Id at 8. In Cobbs, the Supreme Court of California stated that "no intentional
deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining consent may have
failed to meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action
should be pleaded in negligence." Id. at 8.
120. See FURROW ET. AL, supra note 71, at § 6.10.
121. See id. Recent litigation has examined how far the disclosure requirements should
be expanded, including whether it is appropriate to disclose information such as the
physician's HIV status, see Behringer v. Medical Center of Princeton, 592 A2d 1257 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1991), and the physician's substance abuse problems, see Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d
1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
122. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
123. See id. "The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances." Id. at 1106.
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disclosure standard."124 Under this standard, the appropriate
disclosures are established by expert testimony regarding the
disclosure to be expected of a reasonable practitioner in similar
circumstances. 12 5
The medical profession had not significantly suggested an
appropriate disclosure standard, so the lower courts took the
liberty to modify the standard in an attempt to put the patient on
more even footing with the physician.' 26 In 1972, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
professional standard in Canterbury v. Spence.12 7 The Canterbury
court reiterated the negligence approach to informed consent set
forth in Natanson, that the physician owes a duty to provide to the
patient information that is "material" to the patient's decision. 2 8 In
Canterbury, however, the court defined a material risk as one that
"a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know
to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to
the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy."129 Canterbury represents the genesis of the lay
or reasonable patient standard for informed consent actions under
30
a negligence approach.'
Canterbury also articulated the causation element of an informed
consent action based on a negligence theory.' 31 The court held that
any undisclosed risk must materialize and must be harmful to the
patient. 32 Beyond materialization of the harm, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a causal connection between the failure of disclosure
and the harm, by establishing that the patient would have opted
against the treatment had the disclosure been made.'3 This
causation examination is based on an objective standard, not on
124. See FURROW ET. AL, supra note 71, at § 6.10.
125. See id.
126. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 200.
127. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
128. Canterbury, 464 F2d at 786. The patient in Cantebury was paralyzed after spinal
surgery and sued the surgeon for failure to disclose the risks of the operation. Id. at 776.
The court stated, "it is the perogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for
himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie." Id. at 781.
129. Id. at 787.
130. See FURROW ET. AL, supra note 71, at § 6.10. Expert testimony may still be utilized
to establish the risks, benefits, and alternatives to a particular procedure. Id. Note that a
purely subjective standard, relying on the particular patient's own report of what information
the patient deemed material, has found little support. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 211.
131. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791.
132. Id. at 790.
133.

Id.
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what the particular plaintiff-patient would have done.' 34 If the

objectively reasonable patient would have assented to the
treatment had the information been disclosed, causation is not

proved.135
The scope of the disclosure requirements and the reasonable
patient standard established by Canterbury emanates from the
fiduciary duty of the physician and, as such, applies to all
components of patient care, including the choice to forego
treatment. 136
Although states are split on whether the reasonable patient
standard or the professional standard is appropriate in examining
the adequacy of disclosure, 37 all but two states have abandoned the
battery approach to informed consent.138 Legal scholars have
139
universally recognized the negligence standard as the better view.
The battery approach is generally held to be appropriate only in
instances of a complete absence of consent to a procedure, or
40
misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the physician.
Moreover, the trend has been to examine informed consent not on
the basis of a contractual relationship between physician and
4
patient, but on the physician's fiduciary duty to the patient.' '
C.

Informed Consent Statutes

The Canterbury decision and the seemingly patient-friendly
disclosure standard precipitated a wave of statutory reform in the
134. Id. at 791.
135. Id. "If the [reasonable] patient would have undergone the treatment even if
appraised of the omitted information, causation is not established." See Krause, supra note 2,
at 317. This is referred to as "decision causation" as compared to "injury causation." Id.
136. See Krause, supra note 2, at 312. The concept of "informed refusal" is illustrated
by Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980), in which the patient declined the physician's
recommendation to undergo diagnostic testing to detect cancer. Id. at 906. The court held
that "if a patient indicates that he or she is going to decline the . . . test or treatment, then
the doctor has the additional duty of advising of all material risks of which a reasonable
person would want to be informed before deciding not to undergo the procedure." Id.
137. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 203-14 for a detailed discussion of the informed
consent statues of various jurisdictions.
138. See Morgan v. McPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997). Morgan is discussed in Part ilI of
this comment. See Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1998). The Blanchard court
held that "[lhack of informed consent in a medical malpractice action.., operates to negate
a patient's authorization for a procedure, thereby giving rise to a cause of action for battery."
Id. at 524 (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 750-51 (Tenn. 1987)).
139. See Merz, supra note 10, at 232.
140. See RicHARDS, supra note 6, at 206.
141. See id.
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area of medical informed consent. 142 Rather than an attempt to
promote patient autonomy, many of these legislative efforts were
aimed at reducing the impact of medical malpractice claims. 43
Generally, the language of these statutes was not as favorable to
patients as the common law.'4
Informed consent statutes take one of three approaches to
prescribing the disclosure requirements. 145 Some states couch the
disclosure requirements in general terms, allowing courts to
determine the adequacy of particular disclosures.146 Other states are
far more specific,' 47 and two delegate the authority to determine
disclosure requirements to their state medical boards.' 48 The
statutes often define the applicable disclosure standard as
professional or patient oriented. 49 Several states specifically
recognize that a failure to disclose gives rise to an action in
150
negligence.
Since the term "informed consent" entered the legal lexicon in
1957, the legal doctrine has undergone a rapid evolution, reflecting
changes in legal approach, an expansion of the recognition of
patient rights, and an overhaul of medical ethics.'5 ' The new
delivery model of healthcare will raise issues of failure to disclose
information, including reasonable and possibly more expensive
treatment alternatives, because of cost containment efforts by
physicians or third party payors.
An ongoing concern is that the current state of the law in this
area is still inadequate. 52 Current informed consent law has been
described as too restricted in scope, requiring only minimal
disclosure requirements in order to avoid liability, without actually
including the patient in the decision-making process.'53
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 203.
id.
id.
RozovsKY, supra note 1, at § 1.12.
GA- CODE ANN. § 31-9-6 (1996).
IowA CODE § 147.137 (1997).

148.

See HAw. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1993), and TEx REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (2000).

149. See Szczygiel, supra note 3, at 204.
150. See RozovsKY, supra note 1, at § 1.12.1.
151. See Merz supra, note 10, at 231.
152. See generally Katz, supra, note 4.
153. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 934. Informed consent law in action is "ritualistic,
formalistic and hollow." Id.
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EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL INFORMED CONSENT LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Common Law; The Battery Approach

Pennsylvania courts have long recognized respect for patient
autonomy. 154 In 1932, in Moscicki v. Shor,'55 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that an operation on a patient without first
obtaining adequate consent constituted a "technical assault" by the
physician. 156 The term "technical assault" was borrowed from older
cases in other jurisdictions where physicians had operated without
consent.15 v The term was originally used to differentiate a failure to
obtain consent for surgery from the more traditional intentional
tort of battery.15 8 Moscicki held that the intentional tort of technical
assault is independent of an action in negligence, and that the
burden of proof is to show that the procedure was not
authorized. 15 9 This rudimentary analysis of bare consent was the
extent of the law in the Commonwealth, until the doctrine was
60
expanded in 1966 in Gray v. Grunnagle.1
Faced with another surgical fact pattern in Gray, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the scope of the physician's
disclosure duty.16 ' Following the trend in other jurisdictions, the
Gray court held that beyond the bare consent to surgery required
in Miscocki, the physician has an affirmative duty to disclose
information to the patient regarding the nature of the proposed
treatment and any material risks. 162 Looking at the physician and
154. See Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A- 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 342. The court stated that the "act of defendant amounted at least to a
technical assault and battery." Id. at 342. The patient in Moscicki had consented to having
her dentist remove all of her teeth, but insisted that, on the visit in question, only the lower
teeth be removed. Id. at 341. The dentist removed all of the teeth from the anesthetized
patient and the Pennsylvania Superior Court instructed the jury that they could find the
dentist liable for "technical assault." Id. at 344.
157. The Moscicki court cited Throne v. Wandeli, 186 N.W. 146 (Wis. 1922), and Mohr v.
Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
158. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16.
159. See Mosckicki, at 344.
160. 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 674. In. Gray, the patient underwent spinal surgery to find, and possibly
correct, the cause of a leg condition. Id. at 665. The patient was unable to walk after the
surgery. Id. Although he had signed a general consent form, the patient argued that he
believed the surgery would only be exploratory, and that he would be able to consider a
second surgery to correct the source of the problem. Id. at 668. The physician testified that
he did not recall discussing the specific risks of the procedure with the patient. Id. at 673.
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patient as parties to a contract, the court held that for consent to
be operative, both parties must understand the nature, risks, and
expected outcomes of the procedure. 1 Gray also held that
whether the consent of the patient was informed was a question
for the jury.16 Although the patient in Gray had consented to the
procedure, and the issue was whether he understood the nature of
the operation, the court never considered adopting a negligence
standard, relying instead on traditional tort concepts and the idea
65
of technical assault from Moscicki.1
The analysis in Gray relied heavily on a 1961 law review article
for the proposition that the physician-patient relationship is
contractual in nature and that an operation without consent
constitutes an assault and battery. 16 6 It should be noted that the law
review article was written before the legal doctrine of informed
consent had been afforded a detailed examination, and only
discussed cases involving a complete lack of consent prior to
surgery.'6 7 A footnote in the article recognized that traditional tort
concepts might not be appropriate in cases of less than adequate
disclosure of risks. 168
B. Adoption of the Reasonable Patient Standard
Neither Moscicki nor Gray addressed what standard should be
used in determining the disclosure requirement. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court explicitly rejected the professional standard in
examining the adequacy of disclosure in favor of the lay standard
in its 1971 decision in Cooper v. Roberts.161 Under Cooper, the
physician must disclose the facts, risks, and alternatives that a
reasonable person in the patient's situation would consider material
to his decision to undergo treatment. 170 The Cooper court pointed
163. Gray, 223 A.2d at 674. The Gray court viewed uninformed consent as no consent
and concluded that treatment without adequate disclosure results in -a technical assault. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Lynne Heckert, Informed Consent in Pennsylvania - The Need for a
Negligence Standard, 28 ViLL L. REV. 149, 157 (1982). The theory is that failure to disclose
the risk negates consent, and under tort concepts, that consent is ineffective if obtained by
misrepresentation. Id.
166. Gray, 223 A.2d at 669. The court cites Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operative
Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV. 189 (1961).
167. See Powell, supra note 166, 192-208.
168. See id. at 190 n.4.
169. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). While the trial judge found for the defendant
doctors, the superior court held that the jury had been erroneously instructed to judge the
adequacy of the physician's disclosure against that of a reasonable physician. Id. at 651.
170. Id. at 650.
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out that this standard eliminates the need for expert testimony
regarding what risks a similarly situated physician in the
professional community would disclose."'
C. Restricting Informed Consent to Surgical Procedures
Both Moscicki and Gray involved surgical procedures.'7 2 Neither
case addressed the question of whether informed consent was
required in other settings. In Cooper, the superior court held that
the doctrine is limited to surgery and similar procedures or
operations. The procedure in question in Cooper was not surgery,
but rather involved the insertion of a device into the mouth that
reached the stomach to provide a visual examination of the
organ.' 73 The patient's stomach was damaged by the device, and the
court allowed an action based on failure of informed consent
because the procedure was closely related to surgery and "the
same duty of disclosure obtains whether or not the treatment can
be technically termed operative or surgical." 74
The restriction of the doctrine to surgical cases was reinforced in
1980 in Malloy v. Shanahan,7 ' when the Pennsylvania Superior
Court considered whether the doctrine required a physician to
disclose to a patient facts, risks, and alternatives associated with
the prescribing of oral medication. 7 6 This court noted that the
doctrine had only been applied to surgical cases, and it was
177
unwilling to extend the doctrine beyond that limitation.
The problem created by the battery theory, and the resulting
171. Id. at 651.
172. Moscicki involved dental surgery, see supra note 156, and Gray involved spinal
-surgery, see supra note 162.
173. Cooper, 286 A.2d at 648. Although the doctors described the procedure to the
patient, they failed to inform the patient of possible collateral risks. Id.
174. Id. at 649 n.2. The court in Cooper struggled with the nature of the procedure
because Gray held that the doctrine only applied to surgery. Id. at 649. The Cooper court,
however, felt the procedure in question was closely related to surgery because the
"[aippellant was anesthetized and transported to a special area for the examination,
occurrences which seem to closely relate the examination to the normal surgical procedure."
Id.
175. 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
176. Malloy, 421 A.2d at 804. The prescription drug used by the patient in Maloy was
taken by the patient for 12 years, even though she was given a single, non-refillable
prescription. Id. The patient illegally induced pharmacies to provide her the drug over this
time. Id. The patient eventually became partially blind because of the drug use. Id. She
alleged that the prescribing physician had not informed her of any risks. Id. The trial court
refused to charge the jury on the issue of informed consent, and the superior court affirmed.
Id. at 805.
177. Id. at 804.
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restriction of the informed consent doctrine to surgical procedures,
was illustrated most recently in Morgan v. MacPhail.17 8 The
plaintiff in Morgan had suffered multiple rib fractures. 79 Without
her consent, her physician performed an intercostal nerve block,
consisting of the injection of anesthetic into the area of the ribs. 80
The injection resulted in the puncture and collapse of the
underlying lung, a life threatening condition requiring immediate
medical attention.1 81 The trial court held that informed consent was
necessary only for surgical procedures. 182 On appeal, the superior
court questioned the surgical/non-surgical distinction, noting a
degree of artificiality in attempting to quantify the amount of
touching required for an informed consent action.'83 The superior
court, however, felt constrained by the common law rule, and
affirmed the lower court's decision. 1 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the case in 1997,
and affirmed the decision of the superior court.' 85 The supreme
court stated that it is the invasive nature of surgery that gives rise
to the need for informed consent, and that surgical procedures
involve the use of surgical instruments for excision and incision. 86
As the injection of the needle was not as invasive as surgery, there
1 87
was no requirement that the physician obtain informed consent.
178. 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
179. Morgan, 704 A.2d at 618.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The defending physician filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer, arguing that informed consent is necessary only for surgical procedures. Id.
183. Morgan v. McPhail, 672 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
184. Id. at 1363.
185. Morgan, 704 A.2d at 617-18.
186. Id. at 620. "The rationale underlying requiring informed consent for a surgical or
operative procedure and not requiring informed consent for a non-surgical procedure is that
the performance of a surgical procedure upon a patient without his consent constitutes a
technical assault or battery because the patient is typically unconscious and unable to
object." Id. (citing Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 668-69 (Pa. 1966)).
187. See id. at 620. The court noted that informed consent had not been required
outside of surgery, but found that the terms "surgical" and "operative" procedures had not
heretofore been defined by any court. See id. at 619. This court turned to a medical
dictionary for a definition, and then held that the procedure in Morgan did not fall within
the definitions of surgery or operation. Id. The procedure did not involve "an excision or
incision or the use of surgical instruments." See id. "[T]he procedures are more closely
analogous to the introduction of medication through an intravenous needle of line because
both involve the use of needles to inject medication rather than the use of surgical
instruments. Courts applying Pennsylvania law have not required informed consent in cases
involving intravenous administration of medication." Id. (citing Wu v. Spence, 605 A.2d 395
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
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In Pennsylvania, even under a battery theory, the mere touching,
even when it is harmful, is not sufficient to give rise to liability18s
D. No Pennsylvania CausationRequirement
In 1978 the Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly established
that there is no Pennsylvania causation requirement in an informed
consent action, because the action arises as the intentional tort of
battery.18 9 In Sauro v. Shea, a dental patient, uninformed of the
risks of anesthesia, died from cardio-respiratory arrest, a
recognized risk of general anesthesia. 90 The procedure was
performed non-negligently, but the court approved jury instructions
that would allow them to find the doctor liable without a
requirement of causation.' 9' The jury did not have to consider
whether a reasonable person would have chosen to receive the
anesthesia had she been apprised of the alternatives and risks. 92
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the issue of
informed consent and steadfastly adhered to the contractual
analysis of the physician-patient relationship and the battery
approach to informed consent in the case of Gouse v. Cassel.193 The
Gouse court held that the lower court had erred in instructing the
jury to determine whether a reasonable man having the patient's
diagnosis would have agreed to the operation even if the physician
had not failed to disclose the risks. 94 In doing so, the court
188. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 619. The dissent in Morgan noted that the distinction
between surgical and non-surgical is unfounded, and encouraged the court to join other
jurisdictions in abandoning the battery approach to informed consent. See id. at 620-23
(Nigro, J., dissenting).
189. See Sauro v. Shea, 390 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
190. See Sauro, 390 A.2d at 260. The patient was having 23 teeth extracted by an oral
surgeon. See id.
191. See Sauro, 390 A.2d at 261. The patient was given a choice between local and
general anesthesia, but was not informed of the comparative risks. See id. The addition of a
causation requirement may have allowed the jury to conclude that a reasonable person about
to undergo 23 extractions would have chosen the general anesthesia, even if she had been
apprised of the risks. See id.
192. See id. at 261. The Sauro court's position, refusing to require the patient to prove
causation, is consistent with a battery approach to informed consent. See id.
193. 615 A.2d 331 (Pa. 1992). The physician in Grouse recommended removal of the
patient's spleen because of a cyst, and the patient consented. See id. at 332. After the
procedure, however, the patient suffered from multiple complications resulting in an
extended hospital stay and inability to return to work. See id. at 333. The patient alleged that
informed consent was not obtained. See id.
194. See Gouse, 615 A.2d at 333. In Gouse v. CasseU, the court cited the Gray opinion,
"[Slince the agreement between the physician and patient is contractual in nature, for there
to be valid consent it must be clear that both parties understand the nature of the
undertaking." Id. at 334.
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affirmed Pennsylvania's adherence to the theory that failure of
informed consent results in battery, with no causation
195
requirement.
E.

Pennsylvania's Informed Consent Statute

In 1975, in response to a perceived medical malpractice crisis, the
Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the HCSMA. 196 The HCSMA's
primary purposes were to allow for the prompt determination of
medical negligence claims, and to improve the availability of
affordable professional liability insurance. 19 7 The HCSMA included a
definition of informed consent. 19 The definition did not specifically
limit the disclosure requirement to surgical procedures, rather, it
referred to "the proposed treatment or procedure." 199 The definition
did not comment on the underlying theory of liability, but codified
Pennsylvania common law by adopting the reasonable patient
disclosure standard.200 The statute had no impact on informed
consent actions in the Commonwealth, as it was neither relied
21
upon nor cited in subsequent case law.
In 1996, the Pennsylvania General Assembly responded to
concerns raised by physicians about the costs of medical
malpractice insurance and the need for medical malpractice tort
reform. 20 2 The HCSMA was amended to include a more detailed
informed consent definition. 20 3 Rather than referring only to a
195. See id. at 333.
196. Px STAT. ANN. 40 § 1301.101 to .1006 (1975). It is noteworthy that the legislature
was not motivated by a desire to fulfill the ethical goals of informed consent or the
protection of the autonomy rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth.
197. Id. at § 1301.102. The Act established the Medical Professional Liability
Catastrophic Loss (CAT) Fund. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. §1301.811-A(a)(2)-(3). The purpose of the
Fund was to provide affordable malpractice insurance for providers. See id.
198. Id. at 1301.103.
"Informed consent" means for the purposes of this act.., the consent of a patient to
the performance of health care services by a physician or podiatrist: Provided, that
prior to the consent having been given, the physician or podiatrist has informed the
patient of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and
alternatives to treatment or diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider
material to the decision whether or not to undergo treatments or diagnosis.
Id. The definition then articulates the emergency and therapeutic exceptions to the informed
consent requirement. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Malloy, 421 A.2d at 803; Gouse, 615 A.2d at 331.
202. See Daniel A. Durst, Cutting Through Pennsylvanias Medical Informed Consent
Statute: A Reasonable InterpretationAbolishing the Surgical Requirement, 104 Dick. L. Rev.
197, 204 (1999).
203. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1301-811-A (1998).
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"treatment or procedure,"2°4 the new definition requires disclosure
in a limited number of specific situations. 2 5 These include surgery
and the related use of anesthesia, radiation or chemotherapy, blood
transfusions, insertion of a surgical device or appliance, and the
use of experimental medications, devices, or procedures. 0 6 The
definition entitles the physician to present evidence of accepted
medical standards of disclosure, but ultimately retains the
20 7
reasonable patient, or lay standard, of disclosure.
As with the older version, this definition does not address the
underlying theory of liability. The last section of the definition,
however, seems to establish a causation requirement by requiring
proof that the undisclosed information would have substantially
affected the decision to undergo the procedure. 208 "A physician is
liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the patient
204. As used in the original definition, see supra, note 199.
205. 40 PA STAT. ANN. 1301.811-A (1998), which states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the
informed consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative prior to
conducting the following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia(2) Administrating radiation or chemotherapy.
(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner.
(b) Consent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set
forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient
would require to make an informed decision as to the procedure. The physician shall
be entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and those risks
and alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with accepted medical
standards of medical practice would provide.
(c) Expert testimony is required to determine whether the procedure constituted the
type of procedure set forth in subsection (a) and to identify the risks of that
procedure, the alternatives to that procedure and the risks of these alternatives.
(d) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the patient
proves that receiving such information would have been a substantial factor in the
patient's decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in subsection (a).
Id.
206. See id. The amended definition merely codified the common law doctrine by
requiring informed consent for surgery and the related administration of anesthesia, insertion
of a surgical device, and use of experimental devices or medications. See Durst, supra note
202, at 202. The legislature added, however, the requirement that informed consent be
obtained for radiation and chemotherapy treatments and for blood transfusions. See 40 PASTAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A (1998).
207. See 40 PA STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A (c) (1998).
208. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation
requirement in the negligence approach to informed consent. This approach would be
consistent with the Act's stated goal of controlling medical malpractice costs.
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proves that receiving such information would have been a
substantial factor in the patient's decision whether to undergo a
procedure." 0
This requirement would be inconsistent with
Pennsylvania's traditional common law battery approach to
2 10
informed consent law.
The new definition has narrowed the scope of its applicability
from treatments and procedures, generally, to four specific
situations. 211 The lay standard has been retained, but the role of
expert defense testimony on acceptable professional practice has
been clarified.21 2 Most notable is the addition of a causation
213
element to the cause of action.
The new informed consent definition has received little
examination. 214 The Morgan court was not bound by the statute in
refusing to extend the informed consent requirement beyond
surgical procedures, but noted in dicta that the statute merely
represented a codification of the principles set forth in Gray, and
would not have altered its holding. 215 The new definition was
209. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. 1301.811-A(d).
210. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text for a discussion of causation in
Pennsylvania informed consent cases. In Gouse, the court held that
a physician or surgeon who fails to advise a patient of material facts, risks,
complications and alternatives to surgery which a reasonable man in the patient's
position would have considered significant in deciding whether to have the operation
is liable for damages which ensue, and the patient need not prove that a causal
relationship exists between the physician's or surgeon's failure to disclose
information and the patient's consent to undergo the surgery.
Gause, 615 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
211. 40 PA_ STAT. ANN. 1301.811-A(a)(1)-(5), which states as follows:
(a) Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the
informed consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative prior to
conducting the following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia.
(2) Administrating radiation or chemotherapy.
(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner.
Id.
212. See id.
213.

See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. 1301.811-A(d).

214. At the time of this comment, there has been one commentary published on the
amendments to the HCSMA. See Durst, supra note 202. Durst, focusing on the limitation of
informed consent to surgical situations, ignores the apparent causation requirement in the
informed consent definition, but argues that the definition implicitly effaces the
surgical-nonsurgical distinction. See id. at 225. He also argues that courts should examine the
legislative intent of the statute and apply it liberally, requiring informed consent for
procedures beyond those listed in the statute. See id. at 225-26.
215. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 619. "While the new legislation is not applicable to the
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recently applied in an eastern district court case holding that
informed consent is required in blood transfusions.21 6 That court
21 7
did not, however, examine the statute in detail.
It should be noted that Pennsylvania statutes address informed
consent in one area outside of the HCSMA. 218 Under Title 35, Health
and Safety, a physician is specifically required to inform a woman
with breast cancer of alternatives to tumor removal before
219
performing the surgery.
IV.

DOES PENNSYLVANIA INFORMED CONSENT LAW FULFILL THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL DOCTRINES?

The Pennsylvania common law doctrine of informed consent,
grounded in the intentional tort of battery, creates a cause of
action best characterized as a "hybrid tort,"22 ° leading to confusing
results.2 1 Pennsylvania's common law does not go far enough
toward achieving the underlying ethical and policy considerations
222
that form the basis of the informed consent doctrine.
Pennsylvania's statutory disclosure requirements, while broader
than the common law approach, are also inadequate and have not
significantly impacted the application of informed consent law.
instant appeals because the injuries complained of occurred prior to the effective date, even
under this legislation informed consent would not be required in these cases." Id.
216. See Kotofsky v. American Red Cross, 1999 WL 712584 (E.D. Pa.). In Kotofsky, the
plaintiff was allegedly infected with HIV via a blood transfusion that followed cardiac
surgery. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to inform the patient of this
risk. See id. The transfusion in question occurred before the HCSMA amendments were
effective; the court held, however, that the defendants had assumed a duty to obtain
informed consent and refused to grant the defense motion for dismissal. See id.
217. See Kotofsky, 1999 WL 712584.
218. See 35 PA- STAT. ANN. § 5641 (1998). "Before a physician operates on a patient for a
tumor of the breast, a consent form shall have been executed which includes . . . the
following." Id. The statute then states that the form must contain the following phrase, "I
have been informed of the current medically accepted alternatives to radical mastectomy."
Id.
219. See 35 PA-STAT. ANN. § 5641 (1998), Consent for Treatment of Breast Disease. It is
notable that this requirement is under Health and Safety, as opposed to the HCSMA.
220. See Heckert, supra note 93, at 152.
221. See Merz, supra note 10, at 232 n.3. Gray, from which Pennsylvania informed
consent law stems, properly sounded in battery, as the patient gave consent only to
exploratory surgery. See id. "The reliance by the court on the doctrine of informed consent
and on the undisclosed risks that transpired was unnecessary and has contributed to the
confused application of this doctrine." See id.
222. See Part I of this comment for a discussion of the development of the ethical
doctrine of informed consent.
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The Common Law Approach

The legal doctrine of informed consent in Pennsylvania had its
genesis in cases involving the complete failure of a physician to
obtain adequate consent of the patient before performing surgery.22 3
This wrong gave rise to an action in battery.1 4 As most jurisdictions
began to examine situations where consent was obtained but the
adequacy of the information provided was at issue, it was almost
universally accepted that the battery approach did not adequately
protect the interests of the patient or physician.225 The action
properly sounds in negligence.226
The common law doctrine in Pennsylvania, however, is still
limited by the holding in Gray, that any failure of consent results
in a battery.22 7 In Malloy and Cooper, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court was unwilling to modify Gray and apply the more
appropriate theory of professional negligence. 2 8 With its holding in
Morgan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further entrenched
this anachronistic approach.2 2 9 The approach is inadequate and
inconsistent in four respects. First, the approach does not
accurately reflect the nature of the relationship between physician
and patient. Second, the battery approach forces the courts to
impracticably distinguish between surgical and non-surgical
procedures. Third, failure of informed consent does not comport
with the generally accepted characteristics of the intentional tort of
battery. Fourth, the lack of a causation requirement with the
battery approach is unfair to the physician by allowing damages
without requiring the patient to prove a causal relationship between
the physician's failure and any resultant harm.
Regarding the nature of the physician/patient relationship, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court still characterizes this relationship as
primarily contractual.2 30 Given the inequities in the relationship, the
better approach is to recognize the fiduciary duty of the physician.
The inequities in the relationship between consumer and provider,
in knowledge and potential conflicts of interest, are too great to
223.
224.
225.
negligence
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See Moscicki, 163 A. at 341.
See id.
See Part II-B. of this comment for a discussion of the development of the
approach to informed consent.
See Merz, supra note 10, at 232.
See Gray, 223 A.2d at 669.
See MaUoy, 421 A.2d at 804; Cooper, 286 A.2d at 649.
See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 619.
See id. at 617.

2000

Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law

945

treat the patient as an equal party bargaining at arm's length. A
contractual analysis of the relationship should give way to one
recognizing the fiduciary duty of the physician in an effort to better
protect the patient's interests. This approach would guard against
the persistent tendency of physicians to assume a paternalistic
2 31
approach to patient care.
The second reason to reject the battery approach is that it forces
the courts to distinguish between surgical and non-surgical
procedures, because no cause of action can lie without a touching
of the patient.23 1 Moreover, the strict adherence to Gray's surgical
requirement leads to the anomalous result of Morgan, where the
court examines how invasive a procedure must be to constitute a
battery for informed consent purposes.2- This limitation of
disclosure requirements to surgical procedures is inconsistent with
the policy of autonomy and self-determination that is at the heart
of the ethical and legal doctrines of informed consent.
In 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court demonstrated how
adopting a negligence standard more appropriately protects the
patient.- In Mathies v. Mastromonaco, an elderly woman suffered
a fracture of her hip.2 35 The surgeon felt that the better treatment
strategy would be to avoid surgical repair of the hip in favor of a
period of bedrest, even though he admitted this strategy was
"controversial." 23 The physician never informed the patient of the
risk that if the strategy failed, she may never walk again.2 37 The hip
did not heal and she was unable regain the ability to walk.238 If the
surgeon could successfully argue at trial that the treatment
strategy, although controversial, was not negligent, the patient's
medical malpractice action would fail. If the court utilized a battery
approach to informed consent, the patient would be barred from
asserting an action based on the obvious failure to disclose the
risks, because there was no touching that gave rise to the action.
The New Jersey court recognized that an informed consent action
is appropriately based in negligence, and extended the disclosure
requirement to noninvasive procedures, thereby providing
231.
approach
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of a paternalistic
to medical practice.
See Part 111-C of this comment.
See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 617.
See Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999).
Matthies, 733 A-2d at 458.
See id. at 458.
See id. at 459.
See id.
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appropriate recourse for the patient. 239 Under Pennsylvania
common law, a patient in this situation would have no recourse.
The third reason for rejecting the battery approach is that the
failure of informed consent does not comport with the generally
accepted characteristics of the intentional tort of battery.2 4° The
failure in question is one of omission and lacks the requisite intent
on the part of the physician.241 Also, failure of informed consent
would not seem to be an appropriate situation for the imposition of
242
the punitive damages available in traditional battery actions.
The fourth reason for rejecting the battery approach is that the
lack of a causation requirement with the battery approach is unfair
to the physician by allowing damages without requiring the patient
to prove a causal relationship between the physician's failure and
any resultant harm. 24 Pennsylvania courts require the physician to
disclose information that a reasonable person in the patient's
situation would deem appropriate. 24 The patient, however, is not
held to a similar objective standard, by being required to show that
the failure to disclose would have influenced a reasonable person's
decision to undergo the treatment.
B.

Pennsylvania's Informed Consent Statute

The goal of Pennsylvania's informed consent statute is clear. By
limiting informed consent to a few specific procedures, it limits the
situations in which a patient can successfully raise the issue of
informed consent. By adding a causation element to the cause of
action, it increases the defenses available to the physician. The goal
is to reduce the number of malpractice claims based on failure of
informed consent. The statute is ineffective, however, because it
fails to recognize that Pennsylvania courts steadfastly insist that the
failure gives rise to an action in battery, not malpractice.
More importantly, the statute does not adequately protect the
autonomy rights of patients. Limiting the disclosure requirements to
a brief list of specific procedures is inconsistent with respect for
patient autonomy and patient control over medical treatment.
Nothing in the history of the doctrine indicates that a provider's
duty to respect these precepts exists only in the operating room, or
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 464. *
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
id.
id.
Part lII-D of this comment.
Cooper, 286 A.2d at 650.
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in closely related settings.
To its credit, the statute has codified the lay standard of
disclosure, thereby placing the patient on more equal footing with
the physician. Also to its credit, the statute attempts to establish a
causation requirement that would be consistent with a negligence
approach to informed consent. The adoption of a negligence
approach, however, would be inconsistent with limiting informed
consent to a few specific procedures. The negligence approach to
informed consent is based on the fiduciary relationship between
physician and patient and should apply to all treatment situations.
Under the HCSMA, the patient in Matthies would still be unable to
bring a cause of action based on an obvious failure of informed
consent because there was no surgery performed.
While the list of procedures requiring informed consent has
received some attention, the causation requirement in the statute
has been largely ignored by the courts 45 and commentators. The
question remains whether the informed consent definition included
in the amendments to the HCSMA will significantly influence
Pennsylvania courts in their approach to informed consent.
Notably, if the courts stubbornly adhere to the view that any failure
of informed consent sounds in battery, they could seemingly ignore
an informed consent definition buried in legislation, which outlines
procedural requirements and policies for medical malpractice
46
actions.2
CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania courts have stubbornly refused to modify the legal
doctrine of informed consent to reflect the autonomy rights of
patients and the realities of the health care delivery system.
Adoption of a negligence approach to informed consent would
better comport with the underlying ethical and legal theories of the
doctrine and more adequately protect the interests of patients and
providers. The negligence approach better reflects the nature of the
physician-patient relationship, would eliminate the anachronistic
distinction between surgical and non-surgical interventions, and
adds a causation requirement to the cause of action.
245. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 617; Kotofsky, 1999 WL at 712584.
246. The informed consent statute regarding the surgical treatment of breast cancer is
located in the Health and Safety Title of the Code. 35 P.S. § 5641 (1998). This seems to
indicate that, rather than a concern for medical malpractice costs, the disclosure requirement
is intended to protect patient well being and respect patient autonomy rights.
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The HCSMAs attempt to modify informed consent law is
somewhat confused and has been ineffective. The Act should be
further modified to require informed consent in all treatment
situations, and more clearly establish that the cause of action arises
in negligence.
Bryan J. Warren

